This report will explore political and constitutional concerns underlying the U.S. position regarding the ICC. First it will review the history of U.S. involvement in the development of international criminal adjudication, before and after adoption of the ICC treaty. It then will present objections that U.S. opponents have voiced regarding the ICC Statute. Next it will examine areas in which that statute may conflict with the U.S. Constitution, among them prosecutorial power, immunity, rights of the accused, fugitive transfer, and imprisonment. Finally, it will discuss prospects for ratification of the ICC Statute. Legal obstacles to ratification may be surmountable, but not without significant political will to ratify, and that does not exist. The report thus concludes that the United States will neither ratify the ICC Statute, nor support the court, in the foreseeable future.
I. HISTORY OF U.S. INVOLVEMENT IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL ADJUDICATION
In the post-World War II era, the United States was a leader in the development of international criminal adjudication. On the International Military Tribunals at Niirnberg and Tokyo, judges and prosecutors from the United States worked alongside their counterparts from other countries. U.S. military tribunals conducted additional trials. Thousands of individuals were tried for crimes against peace, crimes against humanity, and war crimes -offenses that, along with genocide, constitute the core crimes within the jurisdiction of the ICC. 5 Even as the postwar trials were under way, there was a call to establish a permanent international criminal court within the framework of the nascent United Nations. 6 That proposal languished until 1989, when a representative of Trinidad and Tobago sought reconsideration. 7 The administration of Republican President George H.W. Bush expressed reservations, though it continued to push for transnational cooperation to combat drug-trafficking and terrorism. 8 In not intend to become a party" to the ICC treaty and that it thus "has no legal obligations arising from its signature"). Aug. 7, 1989, at 1993, the administration of President Clinton, a Democrat, proclaimed the United States' "significant and positive interest" in an ICC. 9 Thereafter, U.S. representatives helped to draft the statute that would be considered at a diplomatic conference in 1998 in Rome. The United States simultaneously assisted in drafting the statutes of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, 10 and provided funds and staff once those ad hoc tribunals began operation. 1 1 Then, at Rome, the United States joined six other states in voting against the ICC treaty.
After Rome, the Clinton Administration continued to negotiate at ICC preparatory sessions, but with the aim of insulating the United States from the effects of the treaty. Thus the U.S. delegation pushed for Elements of Crimes that narrowed the scope of the ICC Statute, and it lobbied in vain for a provision that would place U.S. nationals out of the reach of the court. 12 Not everyone in the United States opposed the court. Some U.S. academics wrote favorably about the ICC Statute, 13 and many U.S. nongovernmental organizations worked for ratification of the ICC treaty. 14 Even the U.S. government offered a modicum of grudging 15 Earlier, Pierre-Richard Prosper, ambassador-at-large for war crimes issues, had said that the new administration did "support pursuing accountability for atrocities and war crimes as they occur around the world, 16 but not by means of a permanent international court. He advocated instead the establishment of additional temporary tribunals.
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Legislative initiatives illustrated the enduring and widespread opposition to the ICC within Congress. A law passed in 1999 prohibits use of U.S. funds to assist the ICC.18 An even harsher bill, called the American Servicemembers Protection Act of 2001, would bar any U.S. governmental entity from cooperating with the ICC; enjoin transfer to the ICC of "classified national security information"; deny military aid to many countries that join the ICC; forbid the use of U.S. troops in peacekeeping missions absent a grant of immunity by the U.N. Security Council; and allow the President to use "all means necessary and appropriate" to free U.S. soldiers arrested by the ICC.' 9 The bill has been approved in a number of bipartisan House votes, but has not cleared the Senate. 20 The Bush Administration had opposed an effort to link the bill to U.S. payment of U.N. back dues; however, in late September 2001 it announced support for attaching the bill to "appropriate" legislation. 23 The United States would endeavor to investigate and prosecute all U.S. citizens and servicemembers suspected of crimes within the ICC's jurisdiction, and would not hand over to the ICC anyone who had been subjected to such proceedings. The bill also called for studies comparing the ICC Statute and U.S. laws, and conditioned ratification of the treaty on Presidential certification that the ICC is fair. Perhaps most significant is the fact that, though more moderate than the Servicemembers Protection Act, this bill also assumed that the United States ought not to join the ICC any time soon.
II. U.S. OPPOSITION TO THE ICC STATUTE
The primary U.S. objections to the ICC Statute crystallized as early as a week after the Rome Conference, in hearings before a subcommittee of the Senate's Foreign Relations Committee. Senator Rod Grams opened the hearings by labeling the ICC treaty as not only "bad," but "dangerous," and declared "that the United States will not cede its sovereignty to an institution which claims to have the power to override the US legal system and pass judgment on our foreign policy actions." 24 Strong words have characterized opposition ever since; examples include Senator Helms' description of the ICC as "this international kangaroo court;" 25 Clinton Administration Ambassador David J. Scheffer's claim that one provision is "contrary to the most fundamental principles of treaty law;" 2 6 and Senator Larry Though details may vary, specific U.S. objections cluster around a few themes. First, opponents 28 assert that the ability of the ICC to bypass the Security Council would undermine the settled system of international governance and the U.S. role in that system. Second, they complain that the ICC prosecutor and judges, to be chosen in a manner U.S. opponents consider nondemocratic, would have undue authority to determine the ICC's jurisdiction, and thus may be tempted to launch politically motivated prosecutions. Third, opponents argue that the ICC Statute poses the risks of unfair trial proceedings. Taken as a whole, opponents contend, operation of the ICC as now structured is a menace to the sovereignty of the United States.
A. The Security Council, the United States, and the ICC
Like most countries, the United States is party to the half-century-old Charter of the United Nations, which imposes obligations that "shall prevail" over those under any other international agreement. 29 The Charter establishes the Security Council as a "principal organ," with "primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security .... ,, 30 To that end, the Charter provides that the Council "shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall. 27. Larry E. Craig, "Under the U.N. Gavel," Wash. Post, Aug. 22, 2001, at A19. See also Grams statement, supra n. 24 ("I hope that now the Administration will actively oppose this Court to make sure that it shares the same fate as the League of Nations -and collapses without US support. For this Court truly is a monster, and it is a monster that must be slain.").
28. Although this report speaks collectively of "opponents" or "critics," of course not all of them share all stated concerns or all tactics for blocking the ICC. For instance, one commentator questioned the ICC Statute, Michael J. Glennon, "There's a Point to Going It Alone," Wash. Post, Aug. 12, 2001, at B02, yet also argued that total noncooperation with the ICC, as would be required by the American Servicemembers' Protection Act, supra n. 19, could work against U.S. interests. See Mufson & Sipress, supra n. 15 (quoting Glennon as saying, "Ve should make it easier, not harder, for other nations to investigate and arrest thugs who commit crimes against Americans.").
29 [Vol. 50 in matters affecting international peace and security -initially, war crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity; eventually, aggression and perhaps even terrorism and drug-trafficking. 3 3 It could look into such matters even without a Security Council request. 3 4 The Council could postpone investigations, but only if all permanent members, and a majority of the nonpermanent members, agreed.
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Pointing to these provisions, U.S. opponents argue that all matters of interest to the ICC fall within the jurisdiction of the Security Council; therefore, the Council should have prior review before a matter is referred to a judicial process. 36 Without such review, opponents maintain, the ICC would deprive permanent members of their veto and could trespass on the Security Council's domain. 3 7 Furthermore, the ICC Statute extends jurisdiction to nationals of nonparty states who are accused of crimes committed on the territory of states parties. 38 Opponents predict that this state of affairs will pose a significant deterrent to military action, including U.N. peacekeeping operations, that are necessary to protect international peace and se- 34. See ICC Statute, supra n. 1, arts. 13-15 (permitting exercise of jurisdiction not only on Security Council referral, but also on request of a state party or on prosecutor's own initiative).
35. ICC Statute, supra n.1, art. 16 (allowing twelve-month deferral of investigation or prosecution, renewable indefinitely, pursuant to Security Council resolution). As it stands, the veto power could work to the disadvantage of the United States. If another permanent member -say, China -wished, it could permit ICC investigation of a U.S. national simply by vetoing any resolution for deferral.
36. See Scheffer statement, supra n. 26 ("There will necessarily be cases where the international court cannot and should not have jurisdiction unless the Security Council decides otherwise."). This position also had been raised at the outset of the Rome Conference. See Ruth Wedgwood, "The Pitfalls of Global Justice," N.Y. Times, June 10, 1998, at A29.
37. See Grams statement, supra n. 24 (stating that today "international law regarding peace and security is . . . whatever the Security Council says that it is," but expressing concern that "[w]ith the creation of the International Criminal Court, that will no longer be the case" because of reversal of veto power); U.N. International Criminal Court, Hearing on the International Criminal Court before the International Operations Subcomm. of the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Comm. (July 23, 1998) (statement of Sen. Jesse Helms), available at 1998 WL 12762482 [hereinafter Helms statement] (declaring that ICC statute "represents a massive dilution of the UN Security Council's powers -and of the United States' veto power within the Security Council").
38. See ICC Statute, supra n. 1, art. 2(a). Among those who has criticized this provision, a form of universal jurisdiction, is a former U.S. Secretary of State whom individuals in some countries have attempted to subject to criminal process based on this same universality principle. See generally Kissinger, supra n. 17. curity. 39 Pending legislation, which would restrict U.S. participation in peacekeeping, circumscribe U.S. military aid to ICC member states, and authorize the use of force to release U.S. nationals held in ICC custody, reflects these concerns.
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B. ICC Jurisdiction and Risk of Politically Motivated Prosecution
Fueling objections to the diminished authority of the Security Council are some opponents' fears that nondemocratic governments could control the personnel and activities of the ICC. Each state party to the ICC is to have one vote in the Assembly of States Parties, 4 1 the body empowered to choose and to remove the prosecutor and judges; 4 2 to adopt Elements of Crimes and Rules of Procedure and Evidence; 4 3 and to amend the ICC Statute. 44 At the post-Rome congressional hearings, Senator Grams argued that because of this governance structure, ICC decision-making "will not be confined to those from democratic countries with the rule of law." 45 This argument gives rise to the oft-repeated concern that the ICC will pursue politically motivated prosecutions. 46 Any state party would be able to ask for investigation into a matter, or the prosecutor may open an investigation on her or his own initiative; that is, 39. See Grams statement, supra n. 24 (maintaining arguing that the "most effective deterrent" to international crimes "is the threat of military action -and this Court is undermining the ability of the United States to do that very thing"); Scheffer statement, supra n. 26 (stating that possible application of the statute to U.S. soldiers regardless of ratification could "inhibit the ability of the United States to use its military to meet alliance obligations and participate in multinational operations, including humanitarian interventions to save civilian lives").
40. American Servicemembers' Protection Act of 2001, supra n. 19. 41. ICC Statute, supra n. 1, art. 112. 42. See id., art. 36(6)(a) (providing that Assembly may choose judges by a twothirds majority of present, voting members); id., art. 46(2)(a) (allowing removal of judges by two-thirds majority of states parties, on recommendation by two-thirds of other judges); id., art. 42(4) (providing for choice of prosecutor by vote of "absolute majority" of members); id., art. 46(2)(b) (permitting removal of prosecutor by "absolute majority" of states parties).
43. Id., art. 9(1) (permitting adoption of Elements of Crimes by a two-thirds majority of members); id., art. 51(1) (authorizing adoption of procedural rules by same margin).
44. See id., arts. 121, 122 (providing for amendment by two-thirds majority of states parties); id., art. 5(2) (authorizing eventual addition of crime of aggression pursuant to statute's amendment procedures).
45. Grams statement, supra n. 24 (speaking specifically of ICC judges proprio motu. 47 Opponents have maintained that because a majority of the Assembly of States Parties will select and may fire the prosecutor, the character and motivations of the prosecutor will reflect the character and motivations of a majority of states parties. 48 They feared the possibility that one day the prosecutor, without prior Security Council review, might be allowed to pursue charges of aggression, as defined not by the Council but by the Assembly of States Parties. 49 The breadth of prosecutorial power, coupled with the asserted fear that the prosecutor will be subordinated to the states parties, are pivotal to the politicization objection. 50 Safeguards against such abuse appear in the ICC Statute. A proprio motu investigation could be stopped by vote of two judges in the ICC's Pre-Trial Chamber. 5 1 According to the principle of complementarity, moreover, ICC judges could not deem a case admissible as long as a state was "willing" or able "genuinely to prosecute" the case. 5 2 "Unwillingness" is to be measured by "unjustified delay" or lack of sufficient "impartiality" or "independence" in the proceedings. 53 The United States thus should be able to shield its nationals from the ICC by undertaking a good-faith investigation and, if appropriate, prosecution. These safeguards have not assuaged U.S. critics, who have argued that the judges themselves will be subject to selection and removal by the governments of nondemocratic states parties.
The ICC Statute permits each member state to put forward one candidate to compete for eighteen ICC judgeships. Candidates must 47 . ICC Statute, supra n.1, arts. 13(a), (c), 14, 15. The third method for opening a matter is by Security Council referral, discussed supra § II(A).
48. See Casey & Rivkin statement, supra n. 45 ("The United States has interests and responsibilities around the world and the possibility that a prosecutor and bench staffed by individuals hostile to the United States or its interests is quite real. The Cold War is over, but the United States still has enemies and competitors. Indeed, as the World's only superpower, it is viewed with suspicion by many states, and with outright hostility by more than a few. All would have an equal vote in selecting the ICC's personnel if they choose to ratify the treaty.").
49. Helms statement, supra n. 37 ("I think I can anticipate what will constitute a crime of aggression in the eyes of this Court. It will be an act of aggression whenever the United States of America takes any military action to defend the national interest of the American people unless the United States first seeks and receives the permission of the United Nations."); Scheffer statement, supra n. 26 (arguing that prosecution for aggression ought to require a previous determination of aggression by the Security Council).
50. See Grams statement, supra n. 24 (stating that ICC Statute provides "no effective screen against politically motivated prosecutions"); Scheffer statement, supra n. 26 (asserting that authorizing prosecutor to self-initiate investigations threatens to mire ICC in political controversy); Helms statement, supra n. 37 (complaining that prosecutor would be "accountable to no state or institution for his actions"); Kissinger, supra n. 17, at 90-91 (criticizing extent of prosecutorial discretion). be "persons of high moral character, impartiality and integrity who possess the qualifications required in their respective States for appointment to the highest judicial offices." 5 4 In the view of some U.S. opponents, relying on standards within states, especially those that are nondemocratic, sets too low a threshold. 5 5 Out of this mistrust of the independence and competence of those who would become ICC judges arise, not surprisingly, complaints that the statute gives final say on the extent of the ICC's jurisdiction 56 and on the propriety of the prosecutor's actions to these same judges.
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C. Due Process Concerns
ICC institutions -the judiciary, the prosecutor, and the Assembly of States Parties -also have final say regarding the procedures the court will follow. To a large extent the ICC Statute comprehends the rights of the accused that are honored in the United States; indeed, a representative of the American Bar Association has told Congress that "the Treaty of Rome contains the most comprehensive list of due process protections which has so far been promulgated."
Still, there are differences, most notably, the absence of any right to trial by jury. These have prompted opponents to argue that ICC trials would violate U.S. standards.
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D. State Sovereignty and the ICC
Underlying all these objections is the claim that the ICC structure is less democratic, and so less independent, than U.S. domestic 54. Id., art. 36(1), (3)(a), (4)(b).
55. See Grams statement, supra n.24. 56. See Craig, supra n.27 (stating that "the court's stated mission is dealing with war crimes and crimes against humanity -which, because there is no appeal from its decisions, only the court will have the right to define"); see also ICC Statute, supra n.1, art. 119 ("Any dispute concerning the judicial functions of the Court shall be settled by the decision of the Court.").
57. See Grams statement, supra n. 24. [Vol. 50 political and judicial institutions.6 0 In the past the United States has bridged differences between an international arrangement and internal practice by various means. A favored method has been to ratify a treaty subject to reservations that conformed U.S. treaty obligations to the constraints of the U.S. Constitution. 6 1 The United States sought the same leeway at Rome; nonetheless, the treaty contains an explicit ban on reservations. 62 Likewise, it failed to persuade conferees to permit states parties to avoid ICC prosecution for some crimes during a so-called opt-out period. 6 3 Finally, of course, the United States lost the considerable influence it might have had if the ICC had been subordinated to the Security Council. These losses, opponents argue, forebode an ICC that could work to the detriment of U.S. soldiers and U.S. sovereignty.
III. THE U.S. CONSTITUTION AND THE ICC STATUTE
Opponents' objections to the International Criminal Court intermingle basic questions about the court's assertedly undemocratic foundations with concerns about specific legal and constitutional restraints. This report now focuses on these latter concerns, considering whether U.S. law clashes with the ICC Statute, in the discrete areas of prosecutorial power, immunity and other legal barriers to prosecution, defense rights, surrender of fugitives, and imprisonment. 64 It then examines whether the U.S. constitutional framework would allow reconciliation with the ICC Statute. 62. ICC Statute, supra n. 1, art. 120; see Scheffer statement, supra note 26 (objecting to the ban on reservations). Cf. Bolton statement, supra n. 46 (stating that approval of the ICC Statute would undercut reservations U.S. made when ratifying Genocide Convention).
63. See Scheffer statement, supra n. 26 (describing unsuccessful U.S. bid for "10-year transitional period" when states parties could choose to shield their nationals from prosecution for crimes against humanity or war crimes). The ICC Statute does provide a seven-year opt-out period for war crimes. See ICC Statute, supra n. 1, art. Aiming to "put an end to impunity" for those who commit "the most serious crimes of concern to the international community," 65 the ICC Statute confers on the prosecutor significant powers. In addition to being able to self-initiate an investigation, 6 6 in some circumstances, the prosecutor would be permitted to gather evidence inside a state's territory yet outside the presence of authorities of that state. 67 The Constitution authorizes Congress to enact laws, including those that "define and punish . . . Offences against the Law of Nations," and the President to execute those laws. 68 It gives the President and the Senate joint responsibility for concluding treaties. 69 Nothing in the Constitution forbids conclusion of a treaty or other agreement that cedes some investigative authority. 70 In point of fact, the United States has spearheaded joint ventures in law enforcement that share investigation with authorities in other nationstates.
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B. Official Immunity
Article 27 of the ICC Statute deprives officials of any immunity they may enjoy "under national or international law." 72 Thus, the ICC may exercise jurisdiction over a person regardless of "official capacity as a Head of State or Government, a member of a Government or parliament, an elected representative or a government official," and such status alone does not justify a lesser sentence. 73 The provision builds on less detailed but similar ones in the laws that governed the trials at Nuirnberg and Tokyo, 74 The U.S. Constitution contains no express grant of official immunity. The U.S. Supreme Court, however, has interpreted the Constitution to confer on the President and other governmental representatives certain immunities from legal process. 78 The President enjoys "absolute immunity from civil damage actions arising out of the execution of official duties of office," extending to the "outer perimeter of his authority." 7 9 The President may, however, be made to answer a civil lawsuit that challenges actions taken before assuming office. 8 0 Likewise, the President may be required to give evidence, particularly in a criminal case in which the "fair administration of justice" so demands. shall nevertheless be liable and subject to Indictment, Trial, Judgment and Punishment, according to Law. 8 2 Some scholars derived from the placement of the last clause, coupled with historical considerations, a constitutional rule forbidding criminal prosecution unless and until a President is removed from office following conviction for impeachment. 83 Disputing this interpretation, others maintained that impeachment and prosecution are independent processes, and that nothing in the Constitution bars prosecution of an incumbent President. The U.S. Constitution, therefore, provides immunity, but with significant qualifications. The impeachment provisions may be interpreted to block exercise of criminal jurisdiction over a sitting President, although there is disagreement on this point. There appears to be no bar to prosecution of former Presidents. Indeed, if the President leaves office on account of removal after conviction on impeachment charges, the Constitution explicitly permits criminal proceedings, without reference to where they might occur. Should the ICC secure personal jurisdiction -an important caveat 85 -the Constitution would not appear to bar ICC prosecution of a former President, or even, applying the view of some U.S. scholars, of an incumbent President.
C. Amnesty and Pardon
Another legal means to escape domestic prosecution and punishment, much debated in the context of the ICC, is amnesty. The ICC Statute says nothing about whether, and under what circumstances, a domestic grant of amnesty might preclude the ICC from exercising jurisdiction over an individual. Some scholars have argued that this silence would permit the ICC to respect grants of amnesty; others, that it would not. pertain in the United States. Amnesty often arises out of peace agreements that settle internal conflicts or as part of a transition from dictatorship to democracy, and neither context applies to the United States today. 8 7 There is, however, a relevant and contemporary U.S. corollary: the Presidential pardon. A notable use of this power occurred in 1974, when President Gerald Ford pardoned his predecessor, Richard M. Nixon. One might ask whether, had the ICC been in existence, the pardon alone would have shielded Nixon from international scrutiny for activities as Commander in Chief during the Vietnam War and the coup in Chile. 8 At first glance, the answer would seem to be no. The Constitution explicitly limits the pardon power to "Offences against the United States"; 8 9 it says nothing about the international crimes that would fall within the ICC's jurisdiction. Yet some acts of genocide, torture, and war crimes already are proscribed by U.S. law, and other international offenses could be added. 90 A court might well deem such acts offenses against the United States, and thus within the purview of the pardon power.
D. Criminal Procedure and Rights of the Accused
The ICC Statute reflects international movement toward criminal procedures that respect defendants' rights. 9 1 On establishment of "grounds to believe that a person has committed a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court," questioning of the person, whether or not in custody, must be proceeded by warnings like those that the U.S. Supreme Court set forth in Miranda v. Arizona. 92 An accused enjoys the presumption of innocence, 93 and the prosecution must shoulder the burden of proof "beyond reasonable doubt" at all stages. 9 4 There is a right to bail. 9 5 Also guaranteed are a fair, impartial, speedy, and public hearing; detailed information regarding the charges; adequate preparation of a defense; free, confidential communication with counsel of choice; presence at trial; the right to conduct a defense personally or through counsel, appointed if necessary; the rights to examine opposing witnesses and obtain testimony of favorable witnesses; an interpreter; and the right to decline to testify without having silence used as a factor in determination of a verdict.
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Yet the procedur'es in the statute do not mirror those familiar to U.S. practitioners of criminal law. Some entitlements do not appear as positive rights of an accused, but rather must be inferred from descriptions of prosecutorial responsibilities. 97 The ICC Statute omits a hallmark of U.S. criminal litigation, the protection against unreasonable searches and seizures. 98 Furthermore, its guarantee of witness examination may be qualified more than application of the U.S. constitutional right to confrontation would allow. 99 This has been the case with the ICTY. In a ruling at odds with U.S. law, the ICTY permitted the prosecution to withhold from the defense the identities of certain witnesses. 1 00 And the ICTY is moving toward a use of written evidence that troubled one of its own members, a former U.S. federal judge. 1 0 1
Perhaps most striking is the absence of a jury. As with the ad hoc tribunals, ICC verdicts are to be based on the majority vote of a panel of three judges. 98. See U.S. Const., amend. IV. The statute does permit exclusion of illegally obtained evidence in some circumstances. See ICC Statute, supra n. 1, art. 69(7).
99. Compare ICC Statute, supra n.1, art. 67(1)(e) ("the accused shall be entitled •.. [tlo examine, or have examined, the witnesses against him or her"), with U.S. Const., amend. VI ("the accused shall enjoy the right ... to be confronted with the witnesses against him"). of an acquittal may result in imposition of a guilty verdict by appellate judges who did not witness the trial. 10 4 Some of these procedures deviate from those guaranteed a defendant in a U.S. courtroom. The Constitution guarantees to any defendant charged with a serious crime the right to trial by jury. 1 0 5 The right of appeal by the prosecutor would seem to infringe on both the province of the jury and the common-law understanding of double jeopardy. 1 0 6 Still, the Constitution permits limits on the jury-trial right. Constituent states may secure conviction with a non-unanimous jury verdict.
1 0 7
A person may suffer court-martial based on two-thirds agreement of a military judge and five members. 10 8 Moreover, the Constitution guarantees defendants jury trials "in the State and district wherein the offense shall have been committed," a provision that seems not to apply to trials outside the United States. 1 0 9
E. Sentencing and Imprisonment
In the United States, conviction for many drug offenses carries mandatory minimum sentences of twenty years; conviction for some offenses mandates life imprisonment. 110 For certain murders and other heinous crimes, U.S. statutory law permits the death penalty. 1 ' U.S. statutes further authorize life imprisonment or capital punishment for persons convicted of genocidal killing or of war crimes or torture resulting in death. 1 1 2 Clearly, the sentencing contemplated in the ICC Statute -imprisonment for up to thirty years or, in exceptional circumstances, for life 1 13 -poses no conflict with U.S. legal tradition.
As for incarceration, Article 106 of the ICC Statute requires that conditions of confinement "be consistent with widely accepted international treaty standards governing the treatment of prisoners.
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The same article also states, however, that such conditions "shall be governed by the law of the State of enforcement," and "in no case" shall they "be more or less favourable than those available to prisoners convicted of similar offences in the State of enforcement." ' 1 5 Observing that "in practice, prison conditions vary widely," one U.S. commentator has voiced concern that detention and confinement might not meet "the relatively high standards" of the United States and other Western countries."
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F. Surrender of Fugitives
On issuance of a proper arrest warrant, the ICC Statute obligates a state party to "surrender" a person who has sought asylum within the state. 1 1 7 The statute uses the word "surrender," defined as "the delivering up of a person by a State to the Court," in lieu of the more familiar "extradition," defined as "the delivering up of a person by one State to another. . ".
." 8 Similar terminology governs states' obligations to the ad hoc tribunals. 1 1 9
The United States typically hands over fugitives -including its own nationals -only in accordance with extradition treaties. 120 In the case of the ICTR, the United States did not negotiate a treaty; rather, a U.S. statute implemented an agreement between the President and the ad hoc tribunal. 12 1 A U.S. magistrate refused to surren- der a fugitive, on the ground that the Constitution required an extradition treaty. 122 This decision did not stand, however; a divided panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that the Constitution also permits the transfer of fugitives pursuant to laws enacted by Congress. 123 Assuming that the latter opinion is correct, "surrender" within the meaning of the ICC Statute ought not to pose constitutional difficulties, at least if, as with the ICTR case, surrender adhered to procedural protections typical in extradition proceedings. 12 4 These include two guaranteed by the Constitution: a judicial hearing to assure that the transfer request is supported by sufficient evidence, and the right to petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Another common constraint on fugitive transfers is lapse of time. In keeping with the convention holding certain international offenses imprescriptible, 1 26 the ICC Statute mandates that crimes within its jurisdiction "shall not be subject to any statute of limitations. That is not the case in the United States. Its Genocide Convention Implementation Act of 1987 does state that there is no limitations period for genocidal killing. 1 28 But by implication, domestic prosecution of other genocidal acts, such as the infliction of serious physical or mental harm, would have to take place within the general limitations period of five years. 129 The same would seem to be true for war crimes and for torture not punishable by death, 130 although in all cases the limitations period could be tolled if the indictment alleged a conspiracy or other continuing offense. 131 In any event, these discrepancies alone ought not to prevent surrender, because the limitations defense to extradition appears to derive from treaties and not from the Constitution. Indeed, U.S. law provides that if an extradi-tion treaty places no time limits on prosecution abroad, no time-bar applies.132
Yet another protection, the principle of double criminality, could present difficulty. This requires that the offense at issue be punishable both in the requesting state and in the asylum state. Both the ICC Statute and the U.S. criminal code proscribe genocide, war crimes, and torture. 13 3 Double criminality would seem to be met with regard to these crimes, even though the descriptions of offenses and potential punishments differ. 13 4 This would not be the case for other crimes against humanity, for U.S. law says nothing of them. 13 5 Clearly there is no double criminality. The effect of this is unclear, however. On the one hand, the protection derives not from the Constitution but from the content of treaties and the practice of states. 1 36 On the other hand, a court could find in the protection a purpose of constitutional stature, an insurance against deprivation of liberty without due process of law.
137 Due process requires, for example, that individuals have fair warning that their conduct could subject them to criminal prosecution. Exercise of U.S. authority to surrender a person to stand charges for conduct that U.S. laws do not define as criminal might be seen to infringe on this principle.' 3 8
G. U.S. Constitutional Framework and the ICC Statute
Analysis reveals that the ICC Statute is compatible with many specific U.S. constitutional protections. 139 Yet attributes of the ICC Statute remain under attack. The power to investigate matters without the approval of the Security Council -and so of the United States, a permanent Council member -is viewed as menace to U.S. sovereignty and the democratic principle of government. Though not stated explicitly in the U.S. Constitution, the concept of sovereignty surely has a constitutional, or constitutive, dimension. In the words of John Marshall, the influential early Chief Justice of the United [Vol. 50 United States could resolve one conflict, the dearth of double criminality, by implementing proper domestic legislation at the time of ratification.
14 6 Reconciling other differences will prove more difficult, given the ICC ban on reservations.
14 7 Some states have amended their constitutions in order to ratify the ICC treaty, but there is no chance that such an amendment would be approved in the United States. 4 If identity of U.S. law and ICC law were necessary, therefore, certain substantive and procedural differences could frustrate U.S. ratification.
Some ICC supporters do urge states to enact provisions identical to those in the ICC Statute. An Amnesty International pamphlet, for example, calls for domestic laws with the same crimes, the same universal jurisdiction, the same concepts of penal responsibility, the same limits on defenses, and the same punishments. 14 9 Even U.S. skeptics may favor such legislation. That is because of the principle of complementarity, which precludes ICC intervention in cases that a state has handled in its domestic system, adequately and in good faith. 150 The more U.S. laws conform to those of the ICC, the more the U.S. legal system can deal with cases that might interest the ICC, and thus shield U.S. nationals from international prosecution.
Although identity of laws may be politically desirable, as a matter of U.S. constitutional law, it may not be necessary. Opponents have argued to the contrary, essentially equating U.S. judicial power with judicial power exercised by a foreign body with U.S. consent.
2
But that view is at odds with numerous U.S. opinions permitting variance. 153 U.S. military tribunals are permitted to follow procedures that differ from those in civilian courts.1 5 4 Furthermore, the United States has a history of cooperating with courts abroad in spite of differences. These include not only the post-World War II international military tribunals and today's ad hoc international criminal tribunals, but also courts in the myriad states with which the United States has extradition and other judicial-assistance agreements.' 5 5 The Constitution has been held to allow transfer of a fugitive to the ICTR.' 56 The Supreme Court long ago established that unless a treaty requires otherwise, courts may not refuse surrender for the sole reason that the fugitive is a U.S. national. 57 U.S. courts also have rejected U.S. nationals' claims that the Constitution forbids their surrender to foreign courts that follow procedures unlike those in the United States. 5 8 Indeed, applying the rule of non-inquiry, U.S. courts ordinarily refuse even to look at the criminal justice system of a state requesting extradition. 15 9 U.S. cooperation is of course a form of state action, and thus must accord with the Due Process Clause. But courts considering challenges to cooperation seldom, if ever, find a violation of this guarantee. None of these situations, it is true, perfectly matches the ICC. The ICC is sui generis, neither a military court nor the court of a sovereign state. Unlike prior international criminal tribunals, the ICC, and the obligations that it imposes on states parties, is permanent. Nevertheless, these models of cooperation suggest that, as long as the ICC's practices meet minimum standards of fairness, they should not prevent U.S. participation in the international court.
IV. PROSPECTS FOR U.S. RATIFICATION Most of the discrepancies between the U.S. Constitution and the ICC Statute may be reconcilable. Nevertheless, differences between the ICC's structure and U.S. traditions will continue to provoke vehement protests. ICC opponents, many of whom hold key positions in the Bush Administration or in Congress, have underscored their mistrust of an international court that grants equal voting status to every member state, including those that are not democratic. The U.S. delegates did seek innovations that might ease critics' concerns; thus they worked to regain oversight power for the Security Council, to exempt U.S. nationals from the ICC's jurisdiction, and to create means for conditional consent to the ICC treaty. The refusal of ICC signatories to agree to these restrictions confirmed many U.S. opponents' hostility to the court. The U.S. government might be willing to join an International Criminal Court with jurisdiction limited to cases that the Security Council -which is, of course, subject to the U.S. veto -referred to it. That arrangement, however, is no longer possible. Therefore, the United States is very unlikely either to join or to support the International Criminal Court at any time in the foreseeable future.
noting that "[olur research failed to identify any case in which this theoretical exception has been applied"). Cf. Neely, 180 U.S. at 123 (permitting extradition of U.S. citizen to Cuba based on U.S. law that guaranteed him "'a fair and impartial trial' -not necessarily a trial according to the mode prescribed by this country for crimes committed against its laws, but a trial according to the modes established in the country where the crime was committed, provided such trial be had without discrimination against the accused because of his American citizenship").
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